In this paper, we examine the discrimination of emission taxes between the export and nontradable sectors in a small country. A few articles indicate that there should be no differentiation of environmental policies between sectors in a small country if the government uses indirect instruments as emission taxes. However, we show that the discrimination of emission taxes may occur in a small country that imposes foreign investment quotas. In particular, the possibility that ecological dumping occurs is higher if export goods are more labor intensive than import goods, as in developing countries. Moreover, in the case where imported goods are most capital intensive, both emission tax rates may be lower than marginal environmental damage, and ecological dumping may occur. It is also shown that easing foreign capital quotas may deteriorate the small country's welfare.
Introduction
Environmental preservation is an important contemporary issue, and many countries are attempting to develop institutional design and policies to deal with this issue. However, environmental preservation is difficult in countries that place high priority on economic growth, because such countries are concerned about the decline in the international competitiveness of domestic firms.
Thus, the government in such countries may impose lax environmental regulations on firms so that they are able to retain their competitiveness. This situation is characterized by the term "ecological dumping".
Definitions of ecological dumping are given in Rauscher (1994 .
For example, Rauscher (1997, Ch.2) defines dumping as "an environmental legislation that does not fully internalize the domestic social cost of pollution and, thereby gives domestic producers an advantage in international markets". Moreover, Rauscher (1994 proposes the utilization of nontradable goods as a criterion to evaluate ecological dumping, because trade-related measures of environmental policy are primarily targeted at the sectors that produce traded goods. In such a case, ecological dumping is defined as "the discrimination of the nontraded goods sectors against the exporting sectors in terms of higher pollution-abatement requirements for the same pollutants".
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According to the latter definition, Rauscher (1994 shows that whether the government pursues differentiation of environmental policies between these sectors depends on how the country's terms of trade are affected by these policies. Hence, the government does not have an incentive to differentiate environmental policy between the export and nontradable sectors in the case of a small country, because the distortions other than environmental externalities do not exist in this economy. However, this discussion may be modified if other 1 As denoted in Rauscher (1994 , the government must implement a sectorspecific environmental policy to enable dumping. Actual examples of differential tax systems are offered by the OECD (2001). In addition, refer to Hoel (1996) for differentiation of carbon taxes across production sectors, and see Richter and Schneider (2003) about the discrimination of energy taxes between households and the production sector. distortions exist. 2 In fact, while allowance of foreign capital inflows progresses gradually through negotiations with international groups such as the World Trade Organization, both developed and developing countries still regulate investment from abroad or impose trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) in order to protect domestic industries. Therefore, we need to investigate how environmental policy should be implemented in the case where not only external diseconomies from pollution emissions exist but also where distortions caused by regulation against foreign capital inflows are present.
In the case of a small open economy, Beladi, Chao, and Frasca (1999) examine the welfare effects of foreign investment quotas in addition to emission taxes. 3 If foreign investment quotas are implemented, the optimal emission tax rate is higher than the marginal environmental damage because an increase in the emission tax reduces the rate of return on capital, and, thus, the payments to foreign capital owners are decreased. Meanwhile, an easing of foreign investment quotas does not change the rate of capital return and accelerates the discharge of pollutants. Then, if the emission tax is higher than the marginal damage, the lax quotas improve the country's welfare because pollution tax revenue is increased. However, their research does not involve nontraded goods;
thus, whether differentiation of emission taxes between export and nontraded goods sectors is optimal has not been revealed.
On the other hand, Schneider and Wellisch (1997) apply Rauscher's discussion to the case of a small country with international capital movement, and
show that, if the country's government regulates the aggregate level of pollution emissions in each sector, then allocates its permits to firms according to their capital employment, then such direct controls that achieve social welfare maximization may be differentiated in the case of the opposite of ecological 2 Many researchers have examined the effects of environmental policies in models involving pollution and trade distortions, for instance, Copeland (1994) , Ulph (1997) , and Neary (2006) . While Copeland (1994) considers gradual policy reforms, Ulph (1997) and Neary (2006) demonstrate that, in view of the optimal policy, environmental policies deviate from the first-best policy if trade taxes cannot be removed, and that free trade may not be executed if first-best environmental policies are absent.
3 See Rauscher (1997, Ch.3) and Chao and Yu (1998) for the economic and environmental impacts of a tax on foreign capital. dumping between the export and nontraded goods sectors. However, in contrast to the direct controls, environmental rents do not accrue to producers if the small country's government uses price instruments such as emission taxes.
Thus, even according to Schneider and Wellisch (1997) , it is not optimal that the government discriminates the tax rates between these sectors as in Rauscher (1994, 1997, Ch.5).
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In this paper, we investigate whether ecological dumping can arise in a model involving foreign investment quotas, and examine the welfare effect of the quotas. 5 Our model generalizes those of Rauscher (1994 Rauscher ( , 1997 , Ch.5) and Schneider and Wellisch (1997) in that not only are export and nontraded goods produced and consumed in the country, but also imported goods. Then, we show that, unless foreign capital inflows are zero, either ecological dumping or the opposite of ecological dumping may take place even if the host country's government uses emission taxes. In particular, we derive the following results. First, the possibility that ecological dumping occurs is higher if the export sector is more labor intensive than the import sector, such as in developing countries. Moreover, in the case where the import sector is most capital intensive, both optimal emission tax rates may be lower than the marginal damage, and the emission tax rate on the nontradable sector may be higher than that on the export sector. Secondly, the opposite of ecological dumping can occur if the export sector is more capital intensive than the import sector, such as in developed countries. However, in the case where the import sector is most labor intensive, both emission tax rates are higher than the marginal damage, and the emission tax rate on the nontradable sector may be higher than that on the export sector. Thirdly, a relaxation of foreign investment quotas may reduce the small country's welfare. 4 Recently, Withagen et al. (2007) examined whether preferential treatment of the export sector is optimal under several market structures. They introduce an upper bound on emissions, and assume that the target corresponding to the upper bound is implemented by emission taxes. Their model is discriminative in that 'n' varieties are produced in the export sector. However, ecological dumping still does not occur in the case of a small country. 5 We assume perfectly competitive markets throughout this paper. For the analysis of imperfect competitive markets, refer to, e.g., Walz and Wellisch (1997) , Ulph and Valentini (2001) , and Greaker (2003) for the case of oligopoly in addition to Withagen et al. (2007) cited above, and see Pflüger (2001) for the case of monopolistic competition.
The paper is organized as follows. Below, we reconsider the definition of ecological dumping to clarify the subsequent discussion. Section 2 presents the framework of our model. Section 3 obtains some comparative static results with respect to emission taxes. In Section 4, we derive the combination of optimal emission taxes levied against the export and nontraded goods sectors, then analyze whether each of the jointly optimal emission tax rates is higher or lower than the marginal environmental damage. We analyze the effect of easing foreign investment quotas on a nation's welfare in Section 5. The final section gives concluding remarks.
Definition of ecological dumping
As shown in Rauscher (1994 , ecological dumping occurs when environmental policies are less strict in the tradable goods sector than in the nontradable goods sector. We can easily confirm the direction of the discrimination if either of the environmental taxes is higher than the marginal environmental damage, and the other is lower than the damage. However, in our general model, it is possible that both emission taxes imposed on the export and nontradable sectors are higher or lower than the marginal environmental damage, and these tax rates are discriminated. Hence, by elaborating the definitions of Rauscher (1994, 1997, Ch.2), we redefine ecological dumping in a model involving the nontraded goods sector as follows.
Definition 1: Strong ecological dumping
Strong ecological dumping means that the emission tax of the export sector is lower than the marginal damage and that of the nontradable sector is higher.
Definition 2: Weak ecological dumping:
Weak ecological dumping means that both emission taxes are either lower or higher than the marginal damage, and the emission tax of the export sector is lower than that of the nontradable sector.
The model
We consider a small open economy. Three types of final goods are produced in the economy, and one of them is a nontraded good.
6 Production in each sector is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. We represent the production of an imported good, an exported good, and a nontraded good as y 0 , y 1 , and y 2 , respectively. 7 The economy is endowed with labor (l) and capital (k) as primary factors of production, which are supplied inelastically. We assume that capital inflows from abroad are regulated by foreign investment quotas. Then, if we denote the restricted level of capital inflows as k * , then the total supply of capital in the economy isk + k * .
Pollution is generated as a by-product in the production processes of the exported and nontraded goods, and only has an effect within the country. We denote pollution emissions as z I (I = 1, 2). Emissions of each sector are associated with their own output. We describe the relation as z I = e i y I , where e I is pollution emissions per unit of output and is assumed to be constant. The total amount of pollution (z) with which the country is confronted is written as the sum of each sector's emissions (z = z 1 + z 2 ). The government imposes emission taxes. We denote the tax rates imposed on the export and nontradable sectors by t and τ , respectively. The revenue from these taxes is redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to consumers.
We assume a representative consumer whose utility function is quasilinear.
The utility function is additively separable with respect to pollution damage and consumption of each good. Namely, it is written by u
, where x I (I = 0, 1, 2) is the consumption level of I good, and u I is the utility function received from the consumption of I good. Moreover, the subutility function u I (x I ) is continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. The damage function φ(z) is continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly convex. We represent the relative price of the exported good as p and the price of the nontraded good as q. Hence, the minimum expenditure function is defined as:
If the expenditure function is continuously twice differentiable, the first-and second-order derivatives for the function have the following properties:
where h 1 (p) and h 2 (q) are compensated demand functions for the exported and nontraded goods, respectively. 9 All of the other second-order derivatives are zero except for E pp , E, and E zz .
Noticing the assumptions of a small country and constant returns-to-scale technology, the zero-profit conditions are expressed as:
where c I is the unit cost function with respect to labor and capital in the i-th sector, w is the wage rate, and r is the domestic rental rate.
The factor market equilibrium conditions for labor and capital are:
where c
is the partial derivative of the unit cost functions with respect to factor prices, and denotes the factor requirements for producing a unit of the i-th good from Shepard's lemma. In addition, the market clearing 8 Throughout the paper the subscripts on expenditure, unit cost, and the GDP functions represent the partial derivative with respect to the corresponding variables. 9 The compensated demand function accords with an ordinary demand function because we assume a quasilinear utility function.
condition for the nontraded good, and the total amount of pollution in the country are written as follows:
z = e 1 y 1 + e 2 y 2 .
Note that the nontraded good's demand does not depend directly on the utility level and the pollution damage under our assumption.
There are seven endogenous variables, w, r, q, y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , and z from (2) to (8) . In the next section, we confirm the effects of emission taxes t and τ on these variables, and thereafter examine the welfare effects of the taxes and derive the conditions arising from the ecological dumping or the opposite of ecological dumping.
Preliminaries

Prices of labor, capital, and a nontraded good
First of all, we consider the influences of the emission tax imposed on the export sector on the prices of labor, capital, and the nontraded good. The total derivatives of (2) and (3) yield:
where the determinant of the coefficient matrix (|A|) in (9) is given by:
On the right-hand side of (10) The effects of t on w and r are as follows:
A rise in the emission tax rate on the export sector decreases the return to the factor that is intensively used in the export sector and increases the return to the factor that the import sector intensively uses. That is, if κ 0 > (<)κ 1 , we get w t < (>)0 and r t > (<)0.
Next, considering (11) , the change of the nontraded good's price is derived from (4):
Thus, it is clear that the effect of a rise in t on q depends on the order of factor intensities between the three sectors. We can classify the effect on the nontraded good's price as follows:
where 'a' and 'b' in these conditions represent the classification based on the factor intensity of the import and export sectors: 'a' denotes that κ 0 > κ 1 and
In the case of condition (Ia) (condition (Ib)), we get w t < (>)0 and r t > (<)0 from (11) . In addition, the nontraded goods sector is more capital intensive (labor intensive) than the import sector. Thus, the unit cost in the nontraded goods sector rises because of an increase in the return to the factor intensively used in the nontradable sector, which then increases the nontraded good's price.
Alternatively, suppose that condition (IIa) (condition (IIb)) is satisfied so that we obtain w t > (<)0 and r t < (>)0, and the nontradable sector is more capital intensive (labor intensive) than the import sector. Hence, we can show that a decrease in the return to the factor that is used in the nontradable sector reduces the unit cost in the nontradable sector, and reduces the price.
On the other hand, the effects of the emission tax in the nontradable sector are very clear. From (2) and (3), we can confirm that the emission tax does not change factor prices (dw/dτ = dr/dτ = 0). Then, the influence on the price of the nontraded good is derived from (4):
With regards to payments to foreign capital, (11) indicates that a rise in the emission tax rate on the export sector increases the payment, while an increase in the emission tax on the nontraded goods sector does not influence the rental rate of capital from (15).
Outputs of exported and nontraded Goods
Secondly, we consider the effects of emission taxes on output in each sector.
Noticing that the price of the nontraded good varies with the emission taxes, from (7), the change in y 2 is given as:
The emission tax on the nontraded goods sector definitely decreases this sector's output (dy 2 /dτ = h 2 e 2 < 0). On the other hand, an increase in the emission tax on the export sector affects the output of the nontraded good through a change in the good's price. Noticing h 2 < 0 and the conditions for the sign of q t given in (13) and (14), we can classify the sign of dy 2 /dt as follows:
The demand for the nontraded good decreases (increases) if q t > (<)0, and, thus, output of the nontraded good also decreases (increases).
Next, let us examine the effects of emission taxes and easing foreign investment quotas on the production of an export good. Totally differentiating (5) and (6), we get the following simultaneous equation: 
where δ l and δ k are defined by:
Thus, the influence of emission taxes on the output of the export good are written as:
where Ω l and Ω k are defined as follows:
The signs of Ω l and Ω k follow from the well-known properties of the unit cost function.
We can confirm that the emission tax on the export sector definitely decreases this sector's output from (20). On the other hand, considering that the emission tax on the nontraded good's sector raises this good's price, we find that the effect of the emission tax on the export sector depends on the capital-labor ratio between the three sectors. Hence, utilizing the above conditions, we can classify the effects of the emission tax on the exported products as follows:
Next, we investigate the effect of the easing of foreign investment quotas.
In our model, the quotas do not change the prices of the nontraded good and production factor, and therefore production of the nontraded good is constant.
Considering these points, the effect of a relaxation of the quotas prices on the production of the exported goods results in the following:
That is, the export sector expands if the export sector is more capital intensive than the import sector. This result is known as the Rybczynski effect. The relaxing of foreign investment quotas influences only the outputs of the export and import sectors.
Finally, by using these comparative static results about the output of each sector, we can verify whether emission taxes and foreign investment quotas reduce pollution emissions. In our model, because emissions per unit of output are fixed, it is simply given as:
Jointly optimal emission taxes
In this section, we analyze the welfare effects of emission taxes and whether ecological dumping actually occurs or not.
Considering the expenditure function, the budget constraint of the country is written as:
wherep ≡ p − te 1 ,q ≡ q − τ e 2 . Then, the effects of emission taxes on domestic welfare are expressed as:
(27) and (28) show that the country confronts two kinds of distortions, that is, external diseconomies generated from each sector, and the deviation of the rental rate between domestic and world capital markets caused by foreign investment quotas. Noting that the level of the quotas is positive and constant, the government might use the emission taxes on the export sector in order to decrease the payment to foreign capital, because the emission tax on the nontradable sector cannot affect the rental rate.
Next, we derive the combination of optimal emission taxes (t * , τ * ) for which du/dt = du/τ = 0 are satisfied, and show that the optimal level of these taxes is not equal even if a small country's government uses a price instrument such as an emission tax. We obtain the following simultaneous equations from (27) and (28):
where r t and z ij (I = 1, 2, j = t, τ ) have already been given in (11) and (25), respectively.
We represent the determinant of the coefficient matrix in (29) as |B|. Considering z ij , substituting (16), (20), and (21) into (25), |B| is written as:
The sign of |B| is positive despite the order of the factor intensities between the three sectors. Then, jointly the optimal emission tax rates are expressed as: 
4.1
The case where an import sector is more capital intensive than an export sector (κ 0 > κ 1 )
At the beginning, we consider the case (Ia). If condition (Ia), that is κ 2 > κ 0 > κ 1 is satisfied, the direction of the differentiation of optimal emission taxes is
The case of ecological dumping Figure 1 : Jointly optimal emission taxes under condition (Ia)
clear. Noticing h 2 < 0, the emission tax on the export sector depends on the sign of |A|, and therefore the sign of κ 1 − κ 0 . If we assume κ 0 > κ 1 , the optimal level of the tax is lower than the marginal damage. That is, t * < E z . On the other hand, the emission tax on the nontraded goods sector depends on the sign of κ 0 − κ 2 , so that the optimal level is higher than the marginal damage if
The following proposition summarizes the argument concerning ecological dumping under condition (Ia).
Proposition 1: Suppose that the emission tax rates on the export and nontraded goods sectors are jointly chosen to maximize domestic welfare. Then, strong ecological dumping occurs under condition (Ia).
The diagram is useful to instinctively comprehend the patterns of the discrimination in optimal emission tax rates.
Setting du/dt = 0 in (27), we can derive the optimal tax rate on the export sector given the nonoptimal emission tax rate on the nontradable sector. We represent this relation as t = t 0 (τ ). In the same way, we can obtain τ = τ 0 (t)
by setting du/dτ = 0 in (28). As shown in Figure 1 , we can draw t 0 and τ 0 schedules in the (t, τ ) space. From (27) and (28), the slopes of these schedules depend on the effects of the emission taxes on the production of export and nontraded goods, and the associated emissions discharged from these sectors.
Under condition (Ia), the nontraded goods sector's emission tax decreases pollution emissions of its own sector and the export sector, z 1τ < 0 and z 2τ < 0, and the emission tax on the export sector also decreases pollution emissions of these sectors, z 1t < 0 and z 2t < 0. Hence, the slopes of the two schedules are negative.
Moreover, if foreign capital inflow is zero (k * = 0) in (27), the schedule of the export sector's optimal emission tax is depicted as the dashed line through point A in Figure 1 . We can confirm that the dashed line is located below the line τ 0 comparing the vertical intercepts of these lines. 11 In this case, either of the optimal emission tax rates is equal to marginal environmental damage; and thus the tax rates do not differentiate between the export and nontraded goods sectors.
Here, the payment to foreign capital can be decreased below (11) if the government reduces the export sector's emission tax, while an increase in the emission tax on a nontraded goods sector does not influence the rental rate of capital from (15) . Hence, the emission tax rate on the export sector tends to be set below the marginal environmental damage, reflecting the influence on the rental rate.
This means that t < E z must be satisfied to hold du/dt = 0 in (28) if τ = E z , and a reduction in the export sector's emission tax causes a downward shift of the dashed line in Figure 1 . As a consequence, the line t = t 0 (τ ) corresponds to the schedule of the export sector's optimal emission tax in the case of k * > 0.
However, total pollution emissions increase if the emission tax rate on the export sector is set below the marginal damage. In contrast, because an increase in the emission tax on the nontraded goods sector decreases emissions in both 11 Setting τ = 0, we obtain the following relation with respect to the position of these lines:
where t =t 0 (τ ) denotes the export sector's optimal emission tax under k * = 0, and [τ 0 ] −1 (τ ) means the inverse function of τ = τ 0 (t). Hence, the dashed line is located below the line τ 0 under condition (Ia), when we compare them at their vertical intercepts. Of course, this discussion can be applied to other conditions. sectors, the nontraded goods sector's emission tax rate should be higher than the marginal damage in order to decrease total emissions. Hence, the government has an incentive to set the lower emission tax rate on the export sector and the higher one on the nontraded goods sector, so that jointly optimal emission taxes are achieved at point B in Figure 1 .
Next, we consider the case of condition (IIa). In contrast to condition (Ia), whether the combination of the jointly optimal emission taxes is ecological dumping or not is ambiguous in condition (IIa). However, we can confirm that both of these tax rates are set below the marginal damage under the condition given by (30) and (31). In addition, if we calculate t * − τ * , the following equation is derived with respect to the differentiation in the optimal emission tax rates:
We need to examine the order of each factor's ratio in the export and nontraded goods sectors to clarify the direction of the discrimination in the emission taxes, because condition (IIa) merely denotes that the import good is most capital intensive. Then, we can summarize the discussion as the following proposition. In the case of condition (IIa), either of the optimal emission tax rates is lower than the marginal damage. The reason why the emission tax rate on the export sector is lower than the marginal damage is the same as for the case of condition (Ia). It reflects the influence on the rental rate. On the other hand, 
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We draw the case of ecological dumping in Figure 2 . From (27) and (28), the slopes of t 0 and τ 0 are positive under condition (IIa) because z 1j and z 2j
(j = t, τ ) have opposite signs. In addition, if foreign capital inflow is zero (k * = 0) in (27), the dashed line is located above the line τ 0 comparing the vertical intercept of these lines becauset
Here, because k * = 0, an increase in the export sector's emission tax also causes a downward shift of the dashed line in Figure 2 as in the case of condition (Ia), so that the jointly optimal emission taxes is achieved at point B.
4.2 The case where an import sector is more labor intensive than an export sector (κ 0 < κ 1 )
Conditions (Ia) and (IIa) represent the case where the import sector is more capital intensive than the export sector. However, we can derive different results if the factor intensity of the import and export sectors is opposite to these conditions. In this subsection, we demonstrate these results.
First, we consider the case of condition (Ib). For h 2 < 0, the emission tax on the export sector depends on the sign of |A| and κ 1 − κ 0 . If we assume κ 0 < κ 1 , the optimal level of the tax is lower than the marginal damage. That is, t * > E z . On the other hand, the emission tax on the nontraded goods sector depends on the sign of κ 0 −κ 2 , and the optimal level is higher than the marginal damage if κ 0 > κ 2 . That is, τ * < E z . This is a situation for the opposite of strong ecological dumping.
Next, let us check the case of condition (IIb). Under this condition, both jointly optimal rates of emission taxes are higher than the marginal environmental damage. However, we have already derived (32) with respect to the direction of the discrimination. Hence, the discussion under conditions (Ib) and (IIb) is summarized as the following proposition. If we assume condition (Ib), r t < 0 because κ 1 > κ 2 . Namely, the rental price falls when the emission tax of the export sector is increased. In this case, the government has an incentive to ensure that the emission tax of the export sector is higher than the marginal environmental damage. On the other hand, the government can set the emission tax of the nontradable sector lower than the marginal damage, because this decreases total pollution emissions. Hence, the opposite of strong ecological dumping arises.
On the other hand, in the case of condition (IIb), both optimal emission tax rates are higher than the marginal damage of domestic pollution, because a rise in t reduces the rate of return to foreign capital and has a positive impact on domestic welfare. Then, a rise in t decreases the output of the export good and increases the output of the nontraded good, whereas an increase of τ makes the output of the export good increase and the output of the nontraded good 
A Relaxation of Foreign Investment Quotas
In this section, we investigate the welfare effect of easing foreign investment quotas. The effect of k * on the welfare of a nation under consideration is presented from the differential of (26) using (25) as:
Thus, considering that the quotas do not influence the production of nontradables, the welfare effect of the quotas depends on the change in emissions from the export sector and the level of the emission tax rate on this sector.
The increase in foreign capital inflows makes the export sector contract and total emissions decrease if κ 1 < κ 0 . In this case, the relaxing of foreign investment quotas improves (deteriorates) welfare if the emission tax rate on the export sector is (lower) higher than the marginal environmental damage. In contrast, total emissions increase if κ 1 > κ 0 . Hence, welfare improves (deteriorates) if the emission tax rate of the export sector is higher (lower) than the marginal environmental damage.
Moreover, the welfare effect becomes clearer if we adopt the optimal tax level (t * ). Noticing that t * < (>)E z if κ 1 < (>) κ 0 , a relaxation of foreign investment quotas improves the country's welfare irrespective of the factor intensity of the import and export sectors.
The above discussion can be summarized as the following proposition. This conclusion expands the findings of Beladi, Chao, and Frasca (1999).
They showed that foreign investment quotas increase total emissions and improve welfare if the emission tax is more stringent than the marginal environmental damage. Our result in the case of κ 1 > κ 0 is very similar to that of Beladi, Chao, and Frasca (1999) . However, in our model, foreign investment quotas can reduce total emissions if κ 1 < κ 0 . Thus, the easing of quotas increases welfare even if the emission tax on the export sector is lower than the marginal damage. Moreover, the optimal emission tax imposed on the export sector satisfies this requirement.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of emission taxes on the export and nontradable sectors under foreign investment quotas and the effect of a marginal opening of the quotas. As long as foreign capital inflows are not zero, differentiation of environmental policies between these sectors can arise even if we consider a price instrument such as emission taxes in a small country, and relaxation of foreign investment quotas improves the country's welfare irrespective of the direction of the differentiation of the emission taxes if the country chooses the optimal emission tax. On the other hand, that measure reduces welfare if the emission tax rate on the export sector is higher (lower) than the marginal environmental damage, and the export sector is more labor intensive (capital intensive) than the import sector.
In particular, our conclusions concerning jointly optimal emission taxes provide very interesting proposals from the perspective of developed and developing countries. If the export goods are more labor intensive than the import goods such as in developing countries, ecological dumping may be preferred from the standpoint of domestic welfare. Moreover, in a country in which the import good is most capital intensive, both emission tax rates are lower than the marginal environmental damage, and ecological dumping may arise. Meanwhile, the opposite of ecological dumping may be chosen if the export goods are more capital intensive than the import goods such as in developed countries. In addition, if the imported goods are the most labor intensive, the jointly optimal emission taxes are both higher than the marginal damage of pollution emissions, and the opposite of ecological dumping may occur.
Further research is required to address the following two points. First, we do not consider pollution emissions from the import sector. If the emission tax on this sector is also expected to influence the rental rate of capital, then the government may use the emission tax on the sector in order to reduce the payment to foreign capital owners. Hence, we must analyze the combination of optimal emission taxes including taxation to the import sector.
Second, there are two distortions that are brought about by domestic pollution emissions and foreign investment quotas in our model. However, the existence of other distortions, e.g., trade taxes and minimum wages, may also cause differentiation in emission taxes between the export and nontradable sectors. Thus, we need to further investigate the discrimination in the emission taxes considering other types of distortions.
